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I. INTRODUCTION
Failure to bring timely civil claims bars a plaintiff’s recovery for
1
damages in most jurisdictions. Exactly when a lawsuit for a
particular cause of action becomes untimely, however, usually
depends upon either contractual limitation periods or statutes of
limitation in the jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court
recently considered the timeliness of a fraud claim brought
subsequent to the expiration of an arbitration agreement limitation
2
period. In Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, the court held that an
eighteen-month limitations period for claims pursuant to a real
3
estate transaction was unreasonable as applied to claims of fraud.
Having found a clear intent of the parties to arbitrate, however, the
court enforced the remaining provisions of the arbitration
4
agreement and reinstated an arbitor’s award in favor of the buyers.
5
The Rose decision thus preserved the parties’ freedom to contract,
including the freedom to waive the right to litigate.
Section two of this note explores the general background,
purpose, and application in Minnesota of the key legal concepts
6
7
raised in Rose: limitation periods, the discovery rule, the
8
requirement of reasonableness for contract terms, arbitration
9
10
agreements, and contract silence on relevant statutory provisions.
Section three provides a fact summary of Rose, as well as an overview
11
of the supreme court’s analysis. This analysis is evaluated in
12
section four. Section five concludes that the Minnesota Supreme
Court arrived at a just outcome, but missed an opportunity to
create law that would better protect innocent victims of fraud. The
discovery doctrine should toll contractual limitation periods under
circumstances of fraud even if parties have not specifically
addressed tolling in their contract. Such a bright-line rule would
1. See generally James M. Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of Limitations, 16 SW. U.
L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1986) (discussing policy and pragmatic benefits and detriments
of limitation periods).
2. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2002).
3. Id. at 609.
4. Id. at 610.
5. Id. at 610 n.12.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part II.D.
10. See infra Part II.E.
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part IV.A-D.
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13

be extremely useful, but did not emerge from this fact-driven
decision. Nonetheless, the supreme court did take action that had
14
the same net effect.
This note also concludes that although the home buyer did
prevail in this particular instance under an arbitration agreement,
such agreements are not generally beneficial to home buyers.
There is little reason for home buyers to agree to limit the time
during which they may seek legal recourse, especially for fraud
claims yet undiscovered.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Limitation Periods in Minnesota
Statutes of limitation “fix a limit within which an action must
15
be brought.” A statute of limitation usually commences when the
16
plaintiff knows or should know of the injury. If parties do not
contract for a specific limitation period, jurisdictional statutes
17
apply.
The purpose served by limitation periods is “to promote justice
by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
18
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Such statutes promote
repose, minimize loss of evidence, place parties on equal footing,
encourage prompt enforcement of substantive law, and avoid
19
retrospective application of contemporary standards. Parties
contracting for shorter limitation periods are motivated by the
20
benefits of certainty which such terms provide. For real estate
sales, a time bar against claims reduces the possibility that sellers
13. Id.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 456 (2001).
16. Id.
17. 5 M ARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.26 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 1998); see also Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1866).
“[T]he laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and
where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were
expressly referred to . . . .” Id.
18. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
19. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 15, at 453.
20. In re Brainerd Nat’l Bank, 383 N.W.2d 284, 289 n.7 (Minn. 1986).
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will be sued for damages difficult to prove or defend against after
an unreasonable lapse of time.
Minnesota’s territorial government imposed statutes of
21
limitation long before Minnesota became a state in 1858.
Adhering to this tradition, Minnesota statutes today address fraud
22
claims, providing plaintiffs a six-year period in which to file a
23
claim. In addition, Minnesota case law recognizes the primacy
and validity of contractual limitation periods, unless the periods are
24
judged either unreasonable or contrary to statute. For example,
the courts have looked with disfavor on terms reducing limitation
periods (rather than expanding, for example), and have typically
25
ruled against the party invoking them.
The courts routinely apply statutes of limitation in litigation,
26
but rarely in arbitration. In contrast, however, the Rose decision
treated litigation and arbitration equally by imposing a
27
reasonableness requirement on limitation periods for both. Such
equality in treatment reflects the respect afforded arbitration
28
decisions.
B. Discovery Rule
1. Use of the Discovery Rule to Toll Limitation Periods
It is critical to identify the date on which the limitation period
begins because recovery for damages is barred for claims brought
29
after a limitation period has expired. Most jurisdictions apply the
21. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 4-12 (Minn. Terr. 1851).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977) (stating that a party’s
misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes the matter is
other than as he represents it, (b) is not as confident in accuracy as he states or
implies, or (c) knows he does not have a basis for his statement or implication).
23. M INN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2002).
24. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Minn. 2002).
25. Prior Lake State Bank v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 248 Minn. 383, 388, 80 N.W.2d
612, 616 (1957).
26. Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. 149, 155, 218
N.W.2d 751, 755 (1974) (holding that arbitration was not a legal action in the
same sense as litigation). But see Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Harrisons &
Crosfield, Ltd., 204 F.2d 366, 367 (2d Cir. 1953) (including arbitration as a
“special proceeding” within the scope of legal actions under New York statute).
27. See Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 607.
28. See id. at 606 (internal citations omitted).
29. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations,
63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (1950) (indicating that the running of statutes of
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discovery rule, an equitable doctrine providing that a statutory
limitation period is tolled until the plaintiff knows or should have
30
known of harm sufficient to warrant a claim. The discovery
doctrine protects aggrieved parties against the absurdity of losing
31
their right to sue prior to knowing that they have a valid claim.
Furthermore, the discovery rule prevents those who commit fraud
from misusing statutes of limitation as protective shields for their
32
wrongful acts. The discovery rule thus restricts the ability of
33
defendants to invoke time bars as a shield against plaintiff claims.
For the discovery rule to apply, the plaintiff must meet an
34
objective standard of awareness of her injury. Consequently, the
plaintiff must show that she became aware of harm done to her in a
reasonable period of time. Courts have interpreted this objective
standard with slight variation, depending on the jurisdiction and
35
the particular claim. In United States v. Kubrick, the United States
36
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s claim may be tolled unless
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury, regardless of
37
her awareness of any corresponding legal rights. Most state courts

limitation is based on the date when the claim accrued, typically when injury
occurred or was discovered).
30. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Modern Status of the Application of “Discovery
Rule” to Postpone Running of Limitations Against Actions Relating to Breach of Building
and Construction Contracts, 33 A.L.R.5th 1, 19-20 (1995).
31. See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1203-07 (describing the
purpose of tolling limitation periods until discovery); Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 608
(citing Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 40, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (1931)).
32. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 608 (citing Schmucking, 183 Minn. at 40, 235 N.W. at
634).
33. The “time” pendulum also swings in the other direction to the benefit of
defendants. For example, in Boggs v. Adams, 838 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (N.D.Ill.
1993), the federal district court in northern Illinois found, “The purpose of
statutes of repose . . . is to impose a cap on the applicability of the discovery
rule . . . terminat[ing] liability after a definite period of time.”
34. See, e.g., Wells v. First Am. Bank West, 598 N.W.2d 834, 838 (N.D. 1999).
“The focus is upon whether the plaintiff is aware of facts that would place a
reasonable person on notice a potential claim exists, without regard to the
plaintiff’s subjective beliefs.” Id.
35. See generally 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 11.1.3 (1991)
(discussing elements of the discovery rule applied in different jurisdictions).
36. Id. § 11.1.4, at 145 (identifying the objective standard in U.S. v. Kubrick,
444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979), as a restriction to applying the discovery rule to claims
made under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
37. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122. Compare Witherell v. Weimer, 421 N.E.2d 869,
874 (Ill. 1981), and Franzen v. Deere & Co., 334 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1983), in
which state jurisdictions accommodate plaintiffs’ discovery of the legal claim, not
just the fact of their injury as in Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122.
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38

abide by this same narrow standard. Some apply a standard easier
for the plaintiff to meet by requiring reasonable awareness of an
39
associated legal claim in order for the limitation period to accrue.
The discovery rule originally developed within the common
law, but has now been incorporated into federal and state statutes
40
as a prominent exception to statutes of limitation. The discovery
rule is a statutory exception in many jurisdictions for claims
involving “breach of warranty, progressive occupational disease,
fraud, medical and other professional malpractice, breach of
41
contract, bond performance, and general tort.”
2. Discovery Rule in Minnesota
Minnesota territorial government laws included a discovery
42
provision for tolling statutory limitation periods.
Today,
Minnesota law still includes a discovery provision as part of its six43
year statute of limitation for civil claims, including tolling for
44
fraud.
Minnesota courts have applied this early equitable
principle quite consistently over time, indicating this jurisdiction’s
45
wide acceptance of the discovery rule. Discovery rule tolling
46
applies to both legal and equitable claims in this jurisdiction.
38. CORMAN, supra note 35, § 11.1.4, at 147-48 (discussing the “United States v.
Kubrick Restriction”).
39. Id. at 148.
40. Id. § 11.2, at 170-71.
41. Id. at 171.
42. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 4-12 (Minn. Terr. 1851).
43. M INN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2002). “For relief on the ground of
fraud . . . the cause of action shall not be deemed accrued until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Id. The original version of
this statute is found at Rev. Stat. ch. 70, § 6, subd. 6 (Minn. Terr. 1851).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526, supra note 22, for the
definition of fraudulent misrepresentation.
45. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Minn. 2002)
(citing Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 40, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (1931)
(addressing fraudulent concealment)); accord Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347-48
(1874); Murray v. Fox, 220 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Minn. 1982). See generally Boyum v.
Johnson, 127 F.2d 491, 494 (8th Cir. 1942) (applying Minnesota law and holding
that after the statute of limitation has run, an aggrieved party must show he never
consented to nor had knowledge of the other party’s actions against his own
interest in order to toll the running of the statute); Sanborn v. Trs. of Hamline
Univ., 38 Minn. 211, 211, 36 N.W. 338, 338 (1888) (holding that a fifteen year
delay in bringing suit was not barred where the plaintiff showed a prima facie case
of fraud). But see Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 446-47 (Minn. 1981)
(concluding that “the legislature did not intend the discovery rule for accrual
purposes”).
46. Lewis v. Welch, 47 Minn. 193, 204, 48 N.W. 608, 611 (1891) (pointing out
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Minnesota courts have already applied a variation of the
discovery doctrine to some contractual limitation periods. In
O’Reilly v. Allstate Insurance Co., the court of appeals allowed tolling
of an insurance contract limitation period until “appreciable
damage occur[red] and [was] or should [have] be[en] known to
47
the insured.” This decision is an example of the court applying
the discovery doctrine, normally invoked to toll statutory limitation
48
periods, to toll a contractual limitation period. However, O’Reilly,
dealing with a dispute over the meaning of an insurance contract
term, is distinguishable from Rose, which involved undiscovered
fraud and a contract that expressly included fraud claims behind
49
the aegis of a shortened limitation period.
C. Reasonableness Requirement for Contractual Limitation Periods
1. General Requirement
Parties may contract for shorter or longer limitation periods
50
than those provided by statutes of limitation.
Shortened
limitation periods, however, may be unenforceable if they are
51
deemed unreasonable. Courts have largely declined to define
“reasonable” as applied to contractual limitation periods,
preferring instead to consider the particular circumstances of each
that if a legal action is not barred by a limitation period until after discovery, then
equitable actions should also not be barred).
47. O’Reilly v. Allstate Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 650-51 (Minn. 1986) (applying the discovery doctrine)). But see
Bohlke v. Ass’n Life Ins. Co., No. 4-84-1221, 1986 WL 9677, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept.
4, 1986) (barring airplane crash victim recovery on insurance plan with three-year
limitation period, rejecting tolling until discovery).
48. O’Reilly, 474 N.W.2d at 224.
49. Compare O’Reilly, 474 N.W.2d at 222-23 with Rose Revocable Trust v.
Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 601-05 (Minn. 2002).
50. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions §§ 96, 98 (2000).
51. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D.
Minn. 1999); Prior Lake State Bank v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 248 Minn. 383, 388, 80
N.W.2d 612, 616 (1957); Hayfield Farmers Elevator & Mercantile Co. v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 203 Minn. 522, 530, 282 N.W. 265, 269 (1938); Dechter v.
Nat’l Council of Knights and Ladies of Sec., 130 Minn. 329, 335, 153 N.W. 742, 744
(1915); Stewart v. Nat’l Council of Knights & Ladies of Sec., 125 Minn. 512, 514,
147 N.W. 651, 652 (1914). But cf. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v.
Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947). “Such shorter periods . . . have been held to be
entitled to the constitutional protection of the Fourteenth Amendment [Due
Process Clause] . . . .” Id.
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52

case.
Only one jurisdiction, New York, has identified three
imprecise factors to consider when determining the reasonableness
53
of a contractual limitation period.
Generally, courts want
assurance that contractual limitation periods provide adequate
opportunity for people to seek legal remedy.
2. Minnesota’s Test for Contractual Limitation Periods
Minnesota applies a two-pronged standard for the evaluation
54
of contractual limitation periods.
The first prong looks to
applicable statutes to determine whether the contract term is valid
55
or prohibited. The second prong evaluates the reasonableness of
56
the limitation period applied to the specific facts in a case. The
court uses its discretion to evaluate the reasonableness of private
parties’ contractual limitation periods only when these periods are
legally challenged.
The Rose decision reinforced the existing standard for
57
evaluating shortened contractual limitation periods. The court
applied this two-pronged test to the contractual limitation periods
in the arbitration agreements, a test it had previously applied only
to civil court claims.

52. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 221 F.2d at 706
(upholding under both Ohio and Michigan law a jury finding unreasonable a
sixth-month limitation period for filing an insurance claim, based on the specific
facts of the case).
53. Brown & Guenther v. N. Queensview Homes, Inc., 239 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484
(1963) (considering the following factors to determine reasonableness: (1) all
contract provisions (2) circumstances of performance and (3) relative bargaining
power of the parties).
54. Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 650-51 (Minn. 1986); Prior Lake State Bank, 248 Minn. at 388, 80
N.W.2d at 616.
55. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Minn. 2002)
(citing Henning, 383 N.W.2d at 650-51 and Prior Lake State Bank, 248 Minn. at 388,
80 N.W.2d at 616).
56. Henning, 383 N.W.2d at 650-51 (holding insurance contract limitation
period less than the statutory period acceptable if not unreasonably short); Prior
Lake State Bank, 248 Minn. at 388, 80 N.W.2d at 616 (requiring that surety bond
contract must reasonably limit the time to bring suit to less than the statutory
period); see also Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 113, 120, 72 N.W. 838, 840 (1897)
(holding that fraud tolls the statute of limitation applicable to parties’ contract).
See generally B.H. Glenn, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Time Period, Shorter than
Statute of Limitations, for Bringing Action, 6 A.L.R.3d 1197, 1207 (1966) (surveying
jurisdictions’ requirement that limitation periods not be unreasonable “in itself”
or to “show imposition or undue advantage”).
57. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 606.
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D. Minnesota’s Use of Arbitration Agreements in Real Estate
Transactions
The Minnesota Territory first enacted a statute governing
58
arbitration agreements in 1851.
This first statute applied
common law doctrine and was seldom used to replace standard
59
litigation.
In 1957, Minnesota set a national precedent by
adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955, a codification of
60
Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District. The decision in
Park provided the teeth necessary to enforce arbitration of future
61
disputes based on the parties’ contract terms. This significant
change from traditional common law made clarity and inclusivity of
contract terms paramount when arbitration agreements
62
concerning future disputes were legally challenged.
Recent Minnesota case law emphasizes the pragmatic reason to
uphold arbitration agreements: avoid litigation costs, delays, and
63
court-immobilizing congestion.
Additionally, contract law

58. REV. STAT. ch. 96, §§ 1-21 (Minn. Terr. 1851).
59. Maynard E. Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln
Mills Case, 42 M INN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1958) (describing Minnesota’s arbitration
statutes prior to adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1957).
60. Id. at 333; Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 194, 296
N.W. 475, 481 (1941) (holding that an arbitration agreement could be enforced
for a future dispute).
The decision in this case is perhaps the only one of record in which it
is held that a party after performance has been stopped may proceed
with performance of an executory contract. In effect the holding is
that in the case of an executory contract to arbitrate future
controversies one party may by resort to a sort of self help complete the
arbitration after the other has refused to perform.
Id.
61. Park Constr. Co., 209 Minn. at 183, 296 N.W. at 476.
62. Pirsig, supra note 59, at 346-47 (discussing the effect of interpretation of
the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act).
63. Correll v. Distinctive Dental Servs., P.A., 607 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Minn.
2000) (“The purpose of the arbitration act is to provide an efficient and relatively
inexpensive mechanism for resolving disputes.”); Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. 1988) (“[Arbitration] provides a
comparatively informal, expeditious, and inexpensive procedure.”); Valentine v.
Conticommodity SVS, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. 1984) (“As a general
matter, arbitration is encouraged.”); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d
626, 629 (Minn. 1983) (“[P]ublic policy in Minnesota favors arbitration of disputes
where parties have entered into an arbitration agreement.”); Layne-Minn. Co. v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 289, 123 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1963)
(“[T]he basic intent of the [Uniform Arbitration] [A]ct is to discourage
litigation.”).
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64

promotes the right of parties to freely contract, even if contract
terms supplant a party’s right to remedy by trial.
In 1987, the American Arbitration Association and the
Minnesota Association of Realtors compiled arbitration rules for
65
disputes involving residential home sales. The rules required that
66
arbitrable claims pertain to the physical condition of the property.
These rules were published in May 1988, and within eighteen
months, 102 residential real estate arbitrations had already been
filed, mainly for small claims over issues such as water damage and
67
seller misrepresentation.
In summary, arbitration clauses provide a popular alternative
to litigation. Because consumers’ legal rights may be affected by
such clauses, it is imperative that such contracts be narrowly
construed to limit the rights abrogated by entering such an
agreement.
E. Contract Silence Regarding Applicable Statute or Common Law
1. Contract Silence Regarding Whether a Particular Dispute is
Subject to Arbitration
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that when an
64. Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1022, 1023 (1992). “[T]he vitality of contract [may be assessed] by the extent
to which a legal system implements the classical liberal conception of justice, a
central principle of which is freedom of contract.” Id.
65. James R. Deye, Arbitration of Home Buyer Home Seller Disputes, 1989 Real
Estate Law and Practice 12-13 (Minn. State Bar Ass’n Continuing Legal Educ.); see
also Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 607 (Minn. 2002)
(referencing the extensive use of the Minnesota Realtors Association arbitration
agreement).
66. Deye, supra note 65, at 12-13. Contra Daniel R. Tyson & Steven G.
Thorson, New Residential Purchase Agreements: Supplemental Official Comments of the
Purchase Agreement Commercial Real Property Security., 1988 Real Estate Law and
Practice 3 (Minn. State Bar Ass’n Continuing Legal Educ.) (discussing the
Minnesota State Bar’s concerns that arbitration of residential real estate should
not be contracted for prior to a dispute, that the requirement that disputes of
physical conditions is unclear and may effect legal recourse if title is clouded, and
improperly places certain decisions on the seller rather than the buyer).
67. Deye, supra note 65, at 13-14. Professionals familiar with common
problems arising from real property transactions (e.g. builders, architects,
developers, brokers, appraisers or real estate attorneys) are likely to serve as
arbitrators of residential home sale disputes. Id.; see generally 21 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:68 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed., 2001)
(discussing the selection process of arbitrators with special expertise for a certain
type of dispute).
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arbitration agreement is silent about who decides the issue of
arbitrability of a particular dispute, the court, rather than an
arbitrator, will determine de novo if the issue should be decided by
68
the court or by an arbitration proceeding.
Minnesota law
corresponds with the federal approach of de novo review of the
69
arbitrability of any issue by the court.
Minnesota courts favor submitting disputes to arbitration if the
parties’ intentions are ambiguous or silent regarding the
70
conditions under which arbitration will occur. Nonetheless,
courts have read arbitration agreements narrowly so that not all
issues are necessarily arbitrable merely because an arbitration
agreement exists. For example, the court of appeals has held that
an agreement to arbitrate claims of fraud inducing a home
purchase was not the same as an agreement to arbitrate claims of
71
fraud inducing signing the arbitration contract itself.
2. Contract Silence on Tolling Until Discovery of Fraud
An important issue in Rose is how the court should approach
silence in a contract regarding a statutory provision such as the
tolling of a limitation period until discovery of fraud. In Rose, the
arbitration agreement expressly provided that the limitation period
begins to accrue immediately upon the date of closing the sale.72 In
contrast, Minnesota’s statute of limitation for fraud provides for
tolling until the harmed party knows or should have known of the
73
damage.
The legislative supremacy doctrine provides that if application
of a statute is at issue, the legislature’s intent is determinative of the

68. 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:11 (Jack K. Levin ed.,
1997) (summarizing recent U.S. Supreme Court analyses of arbitrability
decisions).
69. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Minn. 2002)
(applying de novo review to the arbitrability of a dispute); Freeman v. Duluth
Clinic, Inc., 334 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. 1983) (acknowledging the court’s ability
to review de novo the arbitrability of an issue if it is “reasonably debatable”); State v.
Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904, 909-10 (Minn. 1977) (holding that de novo review of
the issue of arbitrability was proper, whereas the arbitrator’s decisions of law and
fact are not). Review of arbitrability was a matter of first impression for the court
in this case. Id. at 909.
70. Heyer v. Moldenhauer, 538 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
71. Id. at 716-17.
72. See infra Part III.A.
73. See supra Part II.B.2.
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74

court’s ruling on the matter. Thus, notwithstanding the highly
75
regarded private right to freely contract, statutes apply where
contract terms end. “In the absence of a contrary indication of
intention [by contracting parties] . . . reference is to the local
76
[state] law . . . .” Although this doctrine is designed to guide
interpretation where multiple jurisdictions’ laws would conflict, it is
arguably also applicable in a simplified form where both parties to
a contract are from the same jurisdiction. Thus, if a contract is
silent on a condition expressly handled by statute, the statute
should apply.
Few cases have addressed the specific issue of contract silence
regarding tolling limitation periods. Guidance, however, can be
deduced from cases involving disputes over whether claims have
been barred by particular limitation periods.
First, state statutes of limitation have been strictly enforced
77
unless they provide specific exceptions. Extending this concept, if
the statue of limitation expressly states an exception, that
78
exception should also be strictly enforced. Second, when the
statute is silent on the issue of tolling until discovery, the court is
empowered to make the determination of whether to toll the
79
accrual of a limitation period. The parallel to statutory silence on
74. Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution
provide foundation for the legislative supremacy doctrine. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1;
M INN. CONST. art. III, § 1, art. IV, § 1; Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis,
Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 570, 102 N.W.2d 528, 534 (1960) (recognizing that the
Minnesota Constitution vests legislative power in the Minnesota House of
Representatives and Senate); Bloom v. Am. Exp. Co., 222 Minn. 249, 256, 23
N.W.2d 570, 575 (1946) (holding that the grant of power to one branch of state
government is denial of that power to other branches). See REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-9 (1975) (providing historical
development of the legislative supremacy doctrine). “[T]he legislative branch
exercises lawmaking power that takes precedence over the lawmaking powers
respectively exercised by the executive and judicial branches.” Id. at 7. See also The
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878) (recognizing the presumption of
validity courts give to statutes); M ICHAEL SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 119-21 (2000) (discussing generally the deference given to
legislatively-made law).
75. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 718-19 (recognizing the limitation on both
the federal and state governments to “impairing the obligation of contracts”).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3) (1971).
77. State v. Bies, 258 Minn. 139, 145, 103 N.W.2d 228, 234 (1960) (citing early
case law for enforcement of statutes of limitation: Cock v. Van Etten, 12 Minn. 522,
12 Gil. 431 (1867); Weston v. Jones, 160 Minn. 32, 199 N.W. 431 (1924);
Lagerman v. Casserly, 107 Minn. 491, 120 N.W. 1086 (1909)).
78. See Bies, 258 Minn. at 145, 103 N.W.2d at 234.
79. E.g., Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 713 A.2d 1019, 1025 (N.J. 1998) (pointing
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tolling for fraud is contractual silence on tolling for fraud, and the
80
court’s role can be presumed to be similar. Third, judicial
determination of when a claim is barred due to an established
81
limitation period creates precedent for a class of similar cases. A
“bright line” created by the court would serve to guide contracting
82
parties. Fourth, “where a general limitation law applicable to
numerous classes of cases conflicts with a law applicable only to a
83
particular class, the latter controls.” Minnesota law expressly
addresses the particular class of cases involving fraud, providing for
84
tolling until discovery.
From these holdings and statutory
guidelines, there is authority allowing for tolling of a contractual
limitation period until the discovery of fraud.
III. THE ROSE DECISION
A. Facts & Procedural History
In January 1996, Rose and Keith Kajander (“Buyers”) signed a
85
purchase agreement to buy Kenneth Eppich’s (“Seller”) house. A
second contract between the parties stipulated that binding
arbitration would be used to resolve all property disagreements
86
between the parties, including fraud claims. The parties agreed to
raise disputes no later than eighteen months from the date of
87
closing, even for fraud.
Unlike the analogous statute of
out that although New Jersey’s statute of limitation for personal injuries is silent
on when the time begins to run on a claim, the court will determine accrual);
Schanilec v. Grand Forks Clinic, Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 253, 255 (N.D. 1999) (citing
Baird for the same proposition); see also Wells v. First Am. Bank West, 598 N.W.2d
834, 837 (N.D. 1999) (acknowledging the court’s role to determine whether a
claim is barred by the statute of limitation if there is no dispute about the facts of
the case).
80. See Baird, 713 A.2d at 1025.
81. See Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277, 285 (N.J. 1961) (quoting 1 DEWITT
M OORE, WOOD ON LIMITATIONS § 122a (4th ed. 1916)) (“[W]hen a cause of action
accrues is a judicial [question], and to determine it in any particular case is to
establish a general rule of law for a class of cases, which rule must be founded on
reason and justice.”).
82. See Bond v. Pa. R.R. Co., 124 Minn. 195, 203, 144 N.W. 942, 945 (1914)
(construing state law to provide uniform guidelines for the commencement of all
civil actions).
83. See Bies, 258 Minn. at 147, 103 N.W.2d at 235.
84. See M INN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2002).
85. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 601 (Minn. 2002).
86. Id. at 603.
87. Id.
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limitation, this contract did not address tolling the limitation
88
period until discovery of any fraud.
Seller represented that the house was free from water
problems. He indicated on documents provided to Buyers that
there was not a wet basement or leaks causing roof, wall or ceiling
89
damage.
However, these statements proved false. Buyers
acquired evidence indicating that Seller began experiencing
“serious water problems” just a year after the house was built,
90
approximately five years prior to this home purchase. In October,
1997, several months after the contractual limitation period lapsed,
Buyers discovered that the building was structurally unsound due
91
to persistent water damage.
Buyers filed suit in February, 1998, and Seller moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the parties’ arbitration agreement
included an eighteen-month limitation period, which had expired
92
by the time the claim was filed. Buyers also initiated arbitration
proceedings by filing a demand with the American Arbitration
93
Association. The district court denied summary judgment for the
Seller, tolled the limitation period in the arbitration agreement,
94
and referred the dispute to arbitration.
Arbitration was
concluded in October, 1999, finding that Seller committed fraud
95
and granting Buyers’ damages. The district court confirmed both
88. Id.
89. Id. Seller filled out a Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement upon
listing the house with a broker. Id. Also, Seller represented to Buyers at closing
that there had been no notable water problems. Id.
90. Id. at 604; Appellant’s Brief at A.3, Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640
N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2002) (No. C3-00-1163). Arbitration findings included,
among other things, seven letters from Smuckler Architect’s attorney to suppliers
and contractors regarding “continuing and pervasive” water problems experienced
by Seller the year following completion of the house. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 604. See
also Appellant’s Brief, supra, at A.16. The district court’s findings included the
affidavit of Seller’s neighbor, to whom Seller indicated he had experienced
significant leaking and water damage in the house. Id.
91. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 604-05. Buyers had siding removed in order to
ascertain the source of window frame deterioration and discovered repeated,
prolonged leaking making the structure unsound. Id.
92. Id. at 602, 604-05.
93. Id. at 605.
94. Id. at 603, 605. The district court concluded that for fraud, contractual
limitations were treated like statutory limitations, in which the time to bring suit is
tolled until discovery of wrongdoing. Id. at 605. Uncertainty regarding when the
Buyers knew or should have known of the defects, and whether the Seller
misrepresented the extent of known water problems, lead the court to find
arbitration appropriate. Id.
95. Id. at 604-05. Buyers did not bring their claim within eighteen months of
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the arbitration award and the tolling of the limitation period until
96
discovery of Seller’s fraud. The court of appeals reversed the
district court, finding no reason to toll the contractual limitation
period despite Seller’s fraud, because the parties had not
97
specifically included a tolling provision in their contract.
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The supreme court reversed the appellate court, finding that,
as applied in this fraud case, the eighteen-month contractual
98
limitation period was unreasonable. The court did not nullify the
entire arbitration agreement but rather enforced the remaining
99
provisions. Emphasizing public policies favoring arbitration and
freedom to contract, it reconfirmed the arbitrator’s award for
100
Buyers. Four significant points can be drawn from this decision.
First, the supreme court extended the state’s reasonableness
101
102
standard for contractual limitation periods to arbitration.
Before Rose, Minnesota courts applied the reasonableness test only
to limitation periods challenged in litigation, and not to those
103
challenged in arbitration proceedings.
Because binding
arbitration is encouraged as a legally valid means of resolving
104
disputes in Minnesota, the court subjected limitation periods in
arbitration agreements to the same standard of reasonableness
105
traditionally applied in litigation.
signing the arbitration agreement. Id. They did, however, file a request to
proceed with arbitration within eighteen months of discovering the source of the
defect. Id. at 605.
96. Id. (resulting in Buyers award of $154,812.12).
97. Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, No. C3-00-1163, 2001 WL 50878, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2001), review granted, (Mar 27, 2001), rev’d, 640 N.W.2d
601 (Minn. 2002) (noting the court of appeals’ recognition that the district court
disregarded the requirement that reasonableness be considered on a case-by-case
basis). The limitation period was determined to be reasonable based in part on
Rose’s attorney status, and the clear language used in the Arbitration Agreement
without provision of tolling for fraud. Id. at *3.
98. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 603.
99. Id. at 610.
100. Id. at 603, 606, 610.
101. Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 650-51 (Minn. 1986).
102. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 607.
103. Id. at 606-07.
104. Id. (recognizing efficiency and cost-savings as strong public policy reasons
favoring upholding arbitration agreements between parties).
105. Id. at 606:
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Second, the court differentiated between statutes of limitation
and contractual limitation periods. The court determined that
106
freedom to contract trumped statutory protections in this case.
Therefore, the parties’ silence regarding a tolling provision under
circumstances of fraud did not justify application of the statutory
107
discovery rule.
The supreme court agreed with the court of
appeals that “it is not proper to impose a tolling requirement for
claims of fraud where the plain language of the agreement does
108
not suggest that one was contemplated.” The court applied the
rule that parties may contract for limitation periods shorter than
statutorily imposed limits unless (1) the limitation is specifically
109
prohibited by statute, or (2) the period fixed is unreasonable.
Third, the supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals’
conclusion that the eighteen-month contractual limitation period
110
beginning from the date of closing was reasonable. Although not
applying it in this case, the court referenced the application of the
111
discovery doctrine in thirty-eight states.
The court also
recognized the impossibility of parties raising a timely claim if they
112
are not yet aware they are harmed. The court did not indicate
what made the contractual limitation term unreasonable; the

A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
M INN. STAT. § 572.08 (2000); see also Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 609 (confirming the
arbitrator’s finding that Buyers did not discover they had a legal claim until after
the eighteen-month limitation period accrued); Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of
Am., 292 Minn. 334, 340, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1972) (submitting to arbitrator
based on parties’ original intent).
106. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 608, 610.
107. Id. at 609. In this regard, the supreme court agreed with the court of
appeals, although it ultimately reversed the decision below. Id. at 610.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 606 (citing Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life
Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 650-51 (Minn. 1986); Prior Lake State Bank v. Nat’l Sur.
Corp., 248 Minn. 383, 388, 80 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1957) (adding that such
provisions are not favored and are strictly construed against the party invoking
them); see also Fitger Brewing Co. v. Am. Bonding Co., 115 Minn. 78, 80, 131 N.W.
1067, 1070 (1911) (“In insurance policies, language used to limit the liability of
the company is uniformly construed strictly against the company, and any doubt
or ambiguity is resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”).
110. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 609.
111. Id. at 609 n.8.
112. Id. at 607-08.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/4

16

Hylden: Contracts—A Rose by Any Other Name: No Tolling of an Arbitration
FINAL HYLDEN EPPICH. DOC

2002]

10/28/2002 11:14 PM

NO TOLLING OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

651

brevity or the firm commencement date of the limitation period
113
remain unnamed possibilities.
Fourth, this decision was limited to the specific facts of the
case. The court determined that reaffirming the arbitration award
was appropriate based on two facts: the parties clearly agreed to
arbitrate their disputes, and the plaintiffs, who were key witnesses,
114
were both deceased.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ROSE DECISION
A. Decision by Default
The supreme court arrived at a just outcome in Rose. However,
it bypassed an opportunity to apply the discovery rule to toll a
contractual limitation period for fraud when the parties’
115
agreement was silent on tolling.
The court relied on general
policy favoring arbitration and accepted the parties’ intent to
arbitrate all claims, including fraud. Had the plaintiffs not died,
the court might have set aside the arbitration decision, and allowed
116
a full trial on the facts, as proposed by the defendant.
The
court’s decision indicates support for arbitration and the right to
freely contract, while reserving judicial authority to interpret the
reasonableness of limitation periods. For the narrow circumstance
in which contract terms do not specifically address tolling the
limitation period for fraud, the court could have provided more
guidance. The court’s efforts to avoid restricting the right to
contract were unnecessary and undesirable in the circumstance of
fraud.
B. A Bright Line Is Desirable, But Was Not Established
Unless parties expressly agree otherwise, contractual limitation
periods should generally be respected. This “limitation clock,”
however, should restart upon the discovery of fraud. The
arbitration agreement in Rose did not specify how parties should
deal with fraud undiscovered before the contractual limitation

113. Id. at 609-10.
114. Id. at 610. Buyers’ deaths were apparently not directly related to the
Seller’s wrongdoing or subsequent legal actions.
115. See supra Part II.E.2.
116. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 610.
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117

period’s expiration.
Given that the statutory discovery doctrine has long been
118
applied to fraud claims in Minnesota and that contracts are
119
interpreted to incorporate existing law, the court should have
applied the statutory discovery doctrine in this case. The benefits
would be two-fold. First, the parties’ primary right to freely
contract would be maintained; no infringement would result if
parties expressly decline tolling for undiscovered fraud. Second, it
would establish that the act of fraud could not be protected as a
“silent rider” in a contractual limitation clause.
C. Arbitration Agreements Are Unlikely to Benefit Home Buyers
Real estate brokers, most commonly representing sellers’
interests, have encouraged the use of arbitration agreements to
120
address future disputes arising from residential home sales. In
Minnesota, these agreements frequently include a clause requiring
that arbitration be requested within a time shorter than the state’s
121
statutory six-year limitation period.
As a result of the Rose holding pertaining to limitation periods,
the supreme court underscored the right to freely contract, the
binding nature of arbitration agreements, and the reluctance to
122
reexamine arbitration decisions.
This development will likely
discourage challenges to completed arbitration.
If parties
dissatisfied with an arbitrator’s award were able to use arbitration
merely as a first step, leaving litigation as recourse for an
unfavorable judgment, the essence and value of arbitration would
be undermined.
In addition to the societal benefit of easing pressure on
overloaded court calendars, real estate arbitration agreements
primarily benefit home sellers and brokers. Waiving the right to
seek legal redress via litigation, however, compromises home
buyers. They lose the option to sue for potentially higher damage
awards if latent defects are discovered after completion of a home
117. Id. at 609.
118. See M INN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2002); see also supra note 43.
119. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1866) (stating the principle
that laws in existence and applicable at the time of contract formation are
incorporated into its terms).
120. Deye, supra note 65, at 12-13.
121. See supra Part II.D.
122. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 606-07.
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123

sale.
Even in Rose, where arbitration concluded in favor of the
home buyers, the arbitration agreement worked against the them
and in favor of the seller. Arbitration expenses for a home buyer
may approximate those of litigation and therefore, as in this case,
merely impose a shorter time frame in which the buyer must act.
In its amicus brief, the Minnesota Association of Realtors
(MAR) suggested that upholding arbitration results would create a
windfall for the home buyer because the seller had already
124
compromised other aspects of the sale.
The court properly
disagreed that the seller made any significant compromises to
obtain an abbreviated eighteen-month limitation period when state
law provides six years. The parties’ original agreement appears to
provide repose and primary benefit for the seller by defining an
absolute time period, commencing at the date of closing, after
which no claim would be recognized.
Although in this case the court upheld an arbitration award
benefiting a home buyer, the procedural aspects of arbitration
agreements for future disputes seem tipped in favor of sellers
rather than buyers, particularly for claims involving fraud. Buyers
beware! With little to lose by declining to sign an arbitration
agreement, home buyers should retain their legal rights and the
option to freely contract anew. An arbitration agreement can
always be made at a later date, once the existence of an injury and
legitimacy of a claim has been ascertained.
If the seller insists on a standardized arbitration agreement
125
126
form at the closing, it may be an adhesion contract, which is
123. See F. PAUL BLAND ET AL., NATL. CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS § 1.3.1 (2001); see
also, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d
Cir. 1942) (discussing historical English common law revocability of arbitration
agreements based on “the jealousy of the English courts for their own
jurisdiction . . . [and their] refus[al] to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate
upon the ground that they were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction”).
124. Rose, 640 N.W.2d at 609.
125. See M INN. ASS’ N OF REALTORS FORM: ARBITRATION DISCLOSURE AND
RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, MN:ADRAA (8/02) (Edina,
Minn.). This standardized contract is commonly offered to home buyers at the
time of making a purchase offer on a home. See id.
126. An adhesion contract is a “standard-form contract prepared by one party, to
be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who has little
choice about the terms.” BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 318-19 (7th ed. 1999). See
generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 296-97 n.4 (3d ed. 1999) (tracing the
development of this concept and the coining of this term by R. Saleilles in a 1901
French text, De la déclartion de volont, as contrat d’adhésion).
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127

unenforceable if legally challenged.
Alternatively, buyers may
protect their interests by striking from the arbitration agreement
provisions shortening the limitation period or including fraud
claims. More proactively, buyers could even insert a handwritten
128
notation that allows for tolling until discovery of any injury.
D. Legislation Could Fill the Gap Left by the Court
A system relying upon individually adjudicated solutions for
recurrent or predictable problems is unwieldy, inefficient,
unnecessary, and hence, undesirable. Minnesota courts and home
buyers currently face this reality with the issues confronted in Rose;
each occurrence of similar circumstances will continue to require
special consideration to determine whether an arbitration
agreement’s limitation period is reasonable.
Alternatively,
legislation could be crafted which would toll limitation periods in
the circumstance of fraud until the injury is discovered, unless the
contract expressly provides otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court, while not restoring the district
court-imposed tolling of a contractual limitation period, took
129
action that had the same net effect. The court found the parties’
contractual limitation term unreasonable. Nevertheless, the court
should have set a bright line establishing clearly that the discovery
rule will toll contractual limitation periods under all circumstances
of fraud if the parties do not expressly exclude tolling. This would
serve to protect both the integrity of contracts and innocent victims
of fraud.
We should not be satisfied with the current case-by-case
evaluation to determine the reasonableness of limitation periods in
arbitration agreements. This system essentially limits justice to only
those home buyers with adequate time, tenacity, and resources to
pursue fraudulent home sellers shielded by shortened limitation
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1979) (referencing
sections of the Restatement serving to limit the potency of standard form contract
terms, such as section 206 (construing terms against the draftsman), section 205
(subject to good faith), and section 208 (unenforceable if found
unconscionable)).
128. FARNSWORTH, supra note 126, § 7.11 (indicating that courts interpret
handwritten terms as controlling over printed terms).
129. See supra Part III.B.
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periods. In lieu of clear guidance from the court, a legislative
solution could be crafted. For example, a statute could prohibit
real estate businesses from offering home sale contracts with
shortened limitation periods when no provisions are made for
tolling the limitation periods until the discovery of the injury.
In conclusion, this case illuminates the disadvantages to home
buyers resulting from arbitration agreements with shortened
limitation periods. Even though the court found in favor of the
home buyer in this instance, its decision was based on finding the
specific arbitration agreement unreasonable.
Allowing
unreasonable terms in home purchase contracts will discourage
buyers with legitimate claims. Buyers will stop short of pursuing
justice due to the impression that they will fail on a technicality.
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